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Water supply, allocation, use and conservation are constantly debated 
in California, often appearing as highly charged political issues in 
candidates' races and on election ballots. This year is no exception, 
with major ballot propositions already scheduled for the June primary 
election and being circulated to qualify for the November general 
election. 
Accordingly this Research Paper on legal aspects of water allocation 
is being published for the valuable background it affords readers wishing 
to learn more about the subject. The author draws on his legal expertise, 
as well as his experience as Staff Director of the Governor's Commission 
to Review California Water Rights Law. The paper emphasizes the crucial 
role of water rights in California water management, and it points to the 
need for and present lack of a political consensus on water law reform. 
The author concludes by suggesting forces that could bring about 
interest-group realignments and other developments favorable to achieving 










Four aspects of the allocation of water in California are of paramount 
importance. First, several different types of water rights are 
recognized, some radically different from the others. Second, two public 
interest limitations on water rights exist, although generally poorly 
developed. Third, in some parts of the state the construction of massive 
water development projects and the creation of elaborate contractual 
arrangements have largely eclipsed the classical water rights. And 
fourth, the law has not been adequately developed in regard to groundwater 
management, the preservation of instream flows and water conservation. 
This paper deals with each of these four matters in turn, then concludes 
with an analy.sis of political aspects of water law reform. 
Water Rights Recognized in California 
Appropriative Water Rights 
When gold rush fever brought thousands of prospectors to California's 
foothills in the late 1840s, there were several ways in which the water 
crucial for mining operations might have been allocated. Spanish and 
Mexican law had, of course, played an important role in earlier years in 
California, and the miners might have turned to those sources for their 
water law principles. The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo protected land 
titles granted under previous regimes, and in fact the pueblo water right 
of municipalities was later recognized by California courts. But the 
coastal municipalities accepted as having pueblo water rights were far 
from the scene when the miners were exploring for gold in the foothills of 
the Sierra Nevada and the Trinity Alps, and resort was not made to the 
Spanish and Mexican sources. 
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Another possibility was the Anglo-American common law, which was well 
established in the eastern states from which many of the gold miners came. 
Common-law principles provided that water rights grew out of land 
rights--that the use of water was given to those who owned the land along 
the stream. The miners, however, were trespassers, prospecting and 
working lands which technically belonged to the u.s. government. Whether 
for that reason or perhaps because they were unfamiliar with the 
common-law rules, the Anglo-American approach was not utilized. 
Instead the gold miners in California treated their water as they 
treated their gold: "first in time, first in right." Just as the first 
person to establish physical control over a mining site was treated in 
practice as having the best claim, the first to divert water from a stream 
to use it in washing the ore was treated as preferred. This principle, 
known later as the system of "prior appropriation," was quickly accepted 
by the California courts and later was copied throughout the Western 
United States. In the leading case of Irwin v. Phillips, the Supreme 
Court of California noted that the principle of prior appropriation was 
fixed by "a universal sense of necessity and propriety." 1 One may 
speculate that the court, part of a state government with at best a 
tenuous hold over the population at that time, believed it could enforce 
no other choice. 
The appropriative water right which was thus recognized at an early 
date in California has several important characteristics. Most 
importantly, it assumes that water is an independentnaturalresGurce to 
be allocated separately from land. In the prior appropriation system land 
ownership rights do not confer water rights, nor is land ownership 
technically a prerequisite to the perfection of an appropriative water 
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right. 
A significant consequence of this notion is that water once 
appropriated may be used where needed. It need not be used on the land 
along a stream, technically known as "riparian" (from the Latin word for 
bank), nor need it be used within the watershed. Gold miners often sent 
appropriated water many miles to the place of need, and later on the 
coastal cities developed water projects for diverting appropriated waters 
from the mountains to the edge of the Pacific Ocean. The most recent 
major water projects in California take water from north to south rather 
than from east to west, again on the basis of a right of prior 
appropriation. 
Beneficial Use.--Beneficial use rather than land ownership came to be 
the central requirement for the appropriative water right. For land in 
the United States, it had been rare to require an owner to put the land to 
beneficial use in order to establish or maintain ownership. But for water 
under the appropriative rights system which has been dominant in the 
Western United States, the property rights rules require that the water 
diverted be put to beneficial use. 
In the early days this requirement may have functioned as a surrogate 
for notice to others that certain quantities of the flow of a stream had 
been claimed. Notice was itself required, often no more formal than a 
notification nailed to a tree near the point of diversion, but the 
beneficial use requirement ordinarily meant that diversion works were 
needed, which provided notice even more clearly. 
Because an appropriative water right extends only to so much water as 
has been put to beneficial use, the right is quantified. That is, each 
appropriator is entitled to the amount diverted and put to beneficial use 
-3-
as of a specific moment in time. If subsequently a larger amount is 
diverted by a particular appropriator, the excess could be claimed only on 
the basis of a subsequent appropriation with a later and more junior 
priority date. Conversely, if in subsequent use a particular appropriator 
diverts less than had previously been diverted and continues the lesser 
diversions for the period required by the law, the appropriative water 
right is reduced to the amount actually diverted and put to beneficial 
use. It can readily be seen that the latter principle, desirable perhaps 
as protection against the speculative holding of water rights, is a major 
disincentive to water conservation measures that could reduce the amount 
needed, say, to irrigate a particular parcel of land. For this reason the 
California Water Code recently was amended to provide that reduction in 
the use of appropriated water because of water conservation efforts is 
"deemed equivalent" to a reasonable beneficial use of the water.2 
This description of the quantified nature of appropriative water 
rights may give an impression of certainty which is often unwarranted. At 
least for the early appropriative water rights not subject to permit 
control by the state, there is considerable uncertainty. For one thing, 
although it may be relatively easy to establish the actual capacity of 
diversion works, there may be considerable doubt as to how much water in 
earlier years was actually diverted and put to beneficial use through 
particular works. Furthermore, particularly with regard to cities, the 
courts have been indulgent in allowing capacity to be expanded in later 
years pursuant to the presumed original intent of the city to serve its 
residents. Such uncertainties have been largely eliminated for surface 
rights acquired by appropriation since 1914, for these require the filing 
of an application with the state and the granting of a permit which 
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specifies the amount of water covered by the right. It remains true even 
for these rights, however, that the water right is good only for the 
amount actually put to beneficial use, which may be less than is shown on 
the face of the permit. 
The Diversion Controversy.--In recent years an important controversy 
has raged regarding appropriative water rights as to the necessity for 
"diversion", i.e., some form of physical control of the water. It is 
clear that in the past most appropriators have diverted the water, either 
by sending it away from the streambed through a canal or by controlling it 
at the site by means of a dam. The California statutes, however, do not 
explicitly require such physical control nor has the California Supreme 
Court ever explicitly laid down such a requirement. · 
In two recent test cases, organizations interested in fisheries have 
sought so-called "instream appropriations" in order to insure minimum 
flows in particular streams. In the first case, California Trout, a 
private organization, applied to the state to appropriate three cubic feet 
per second of water from Redwood Creek in Marin County. No dam, ditch or 
other water diversion structure was planned, and California Trout made it 
clear it simply wished the water to be left in the stream for fishery 
purposes. Subsequently the State Department of Fish and Game filed a 
similar application for the appropriation of water from the Mattole River 
in Humboldt County. In both cases the State Water Resources Control 
Board, the administrative entity charged with the responsibility for 
receiving and processing applications to appropriate surface waters, 
returned the applications without processing them. The board took the 
position that California law requires "control akin to possession" in 
order to have an appropriative water right. Neither case went to the 
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California Supreme Court, but in both cases the Court of Appeal agreed 
with the State Water Resources Control Board.3 The decisions noted 
certain statutes which imply, they said, that physical control akin to 
possession is required, and one decision emphasized provisions of the 
water code which reflect legislative solicitude for the protection of 
instream values by means other than an appropriation.4 
In the contemporary administration of California's prior appropriation 
system of water rights, a crucial question is whether unappropriated water 
is available for appropriation. The water, of course, must be in a 
watercourse, that is, a stream flowing in a bed with banks. Thus one 
cannot appropriate water flowing in a diffused fashion over the surface of 
the earth. Such water is not in a watercourse, and it belongs to the 
owner of the land upon which it is found. 
Unappropriated water in a watercourse and available for appropriation 
must not be subject to vested rights, whether appropriative or otherwise, 
nor must it be needed in the watercourse for the protection of beneficial 
uses such as fisheries.S Since for any particular watercourse, it is rare 
to have a complete and precise list of all "vested" water rights, there 
often is considerable doubt as to whether there is unappropriated water 
available for appropriation. The question is settled initially in 
administrative proceedings in which eKpertise in water resources 
engineering plays an important role. Often the answer is that water is 
available for appropriation in some seasons of the year but not in others. 
Since by definition an appropriator of water acquires a priority date 
junior to all previously existing water rights, it may legitimately be 
asked how much difference it makes whether water is available for 
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appropriation. It might be argued that the appropriator takes his or her 
chances, and if no water subsequently is available for appropriation, it 
is that person's loss. However, the granting of an appropriative right 
may well create expectations in the permittee that water will be available 
at least at some point in time, and the existence of the "paper right" may 
encourage the appropriator to take acts which could result in controversy 
or litigation, either with those holding water rights or with those 
charged with protecting beneficial instream uses. In California, it 
appears as a rule of thumb that appropriative water rights are issued only 
if it may reasonably be expected that water will be available at least 
half the time covered by the right. 
The courts protect junior as well as senior appropriators. Although 
"first in time, first in right" means that junior appropriator B can do 
nothing to interfere with senior appropriator A's diversion, B is entitled 
to have the stream in the condition it was when he initiated his 
appropriation, insofar as is necessary to protect his diversion. Thus, 
for example, B can object to A changing his point of diversion, say from a 
point upstream of B to a point downstream from B, if the resulting change 
in return flow to the stream works to B's disadvantage. This would be the 
case where B had appropriative rights to A's return flow. 
This protection of junior appropriators contributes to rigidity in the 
pattern of allocation of appropriative water rights. The fact that many 
such rights are held by water districts, which acquired them to provide 
for water supply in the district's designated service area, contributes to 
this rigidity. Although in principle an appropriative water right is 
freely transferable independent of land ownership, these constraints mean 
transfers occur much less frequently than might be supposed. 
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There are no precise statistics in California on the particular 
quantities of water used on the basis of particular kinds of water rights. 
It is clear, however, that the appropriative water right is far and away 
the most important. Of the roughly 200 million acre feet which the state 
receives annually in precipitation, most is evaporated, evapotranspired by 
native vegetation, or runs off to the ocean. Approximately 37,000,000 
acre feet is used for irrigation, municipal water supply, or otherwise, 
but since there is a certain amount of reuse of water the average annual 
net water demand is about 31,000,000 acre feet. Of this amount, it 
appears that about half is used on the basis of an appropriative right to 
surface water. In addition considerable quantities of groundwater are 
used on the basis of an appropriative right, as will be discussed further 
below. 
Riparian Water Rights 
Although the riparian water right of the Anglo-American common law was 
dominant in the 19th Century and remains so today throughout the eastern 
and midwestern United States, many western states have not recognized 
riparian rights at all. These states, known generally as the "Colorado 
Doctrine" states, repudiated the riparian water right on the ground that 
it is by nature unsuitable for semi-arid conditions,6 since in principle 
it is thought to provide little security of investment. 
California, however, followed another course. The leading case of 
Irwin v. Phillips applied appropriative principles rather than riparian 
principles, not on the ground the former were intrinsically better suited 
to local conditions, but rather on the ground neither litigant there had a 
proprietary interest which could serve as the foundation for the riparian 
right. For decades after Irwin v. Phillips was decided, there were doubts 
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as to whether California recognized riparian water rights or not, and the 
debate took on political as well as legal importance.7 
The issue was finally settled in 1886 in the monumental case of Lux v. 
Haggin. This was truly a battle of the giants. Lux was Charles Lux of 
the Miller and Lux Company, which owned tremendous quantities of land 
throughout the San Joaquin Valley, particularly along the Kern River and 
the San Joaquin River. These were ranching lands, and the Miller and Lux 
Company relied on spring flood flows to irrigate these lands and to 
deposit silt upon them. As landowners, they claimed a riparian right to 
have these flows uninterrupted by those above them. Haggin was one of the 
founding partners of the Kern River Land and Cattle Company, later to 
become the Kern County Land Company, a powerful force in the southern part 
of the San Joaquin Valley. Haggin and his partners intended to divert 
large quantities of water upstream from Miller and Lux to use for 
irrigation. 
The case was in the courts for nine years, which in that epoch was 
considered a long time for litigation, and resulted in a four-to-three 
decision of the California Supreme Court which covers nearly 200 pages in 
the official reports. Although many legal arguments were made and the 
decision amounts to a mini-treatise on California water rights law in the 
19th Century, the gist of the decision was that in 1850 California had 
adopted the common law as the law of the state and the common law gives to 
the riparian a right to use water in the contiguous water course. Nothing 
in Irwin v. Phillips changed that principle, since both parties there were 
technically trespassers and consequently the riparian right was 
irrelevant. The court noted that the common-law riparian right not only 
exists in California but is superior to appropriative rights, except in 
-9-
the rare case when the appropriative right has vested before a patent to 
the riparian land was issued by the government.8 
The riparian water right, like the appropriative water right, is a 
right simply to use water--it is "usufructuary." All water remains "the 
property of the people,"9 although it is a subject of debate whether any 
consequences flow from that residual public ownership. 
Aside from being usufructuary, the riparian right is entirely 
different from the appropriative right. It depends on land ownership. It 
does not require use--in principle an unexercised riparian right has the 
same status as an exercised riparian right, although the California 
legislature has placed some limitation upon that principle.lO When 
exercised, the riparian water right is limited to use on a riparian parcel 
within the watershed.ll Apparently the latter limitation is based on the 
idea that land and water go together, and that water used within the 
watershed will, at least in part, be returned to the stream from which it 
was diverted. 
A "Reasonable" Share.--According to the California approach to 
riparian water rights, each riparian is entitled to a "reasonable" share 
of the natural flow of the stream.12 There is a right to storage,l3 but 
water may not be stored for longer than a temporary period.l4 
A variety of factors are considered in deciding what constitutes a 
reasonable share. The Restatement of Torts suggests nine such factors: 
the purpose of the use; the suitability of the use to the watercourse; the 
economic value of theuse;thesocial value of the use (with domestic use 
given preference); the extent and amount of harm caused to another; the 
practicality of adjusting the use to avoid that harm; the practicality of 
adjusting the quantity of water used by each claimant; the burden of 
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requiring the user causing the harm to bear the loss; and protection of 
existing values of land, investments and enterprises.15 The final factor 
mentioned by the restatement represents a deviation from the commonly 
stated idea that riparians among themselves stand on an equal footing, 
whether or not they have made use of their riparian right, and it may be 
questioned whether this factor will be accepted by the courts in 
California. 
The states in the west which like California have recognized riparian 
as well as appropriative rights have been known as "California doctrine" 
states. With the exception of California, however, all have in one way or 
another very significantly limited the riparian right. California 
attempted to join in this pattern through provisions in the Water 
Commission Act of 1913 which would have limited the riparian right, for 
example by providing the riparian right is lost if not put to use within 
ten years of the statute. These limitations, however, were declared 
unconstitutional when challenged in court,l6 so that the riparian right in 
California today retains nearly the importance which it had in 1886. 
Given changes in the other states, one noted authority has suggested that 
it would be more appropriate now to refer to the "California rule" rather 
than the "California doctrine."17 
Although the legal status of the riparian may be unchanged in 
California, there have been developments which as a practical matter have 
provided greater certainty as to who the riparians are and how much water 
they are entitled to claim. As major water development projects have been 
planned and constructed, such as the federal government's Central Valley 
Project, negotiations have taken place between the project managers and 
riparians, and in many cases agreements and exchanges have been worked 
-11-
out. Thus, for example, riparians on the San Joaquin River have exchanged 
their water rights to natural flow for entitlements to project waters 
released from Friant Dam. 
A similar process has occurred on the Sacramento River as a result of 
the construction of Shasta Dam. It appears today that the major users of 
water who claim it on the basis of riparian rights are found in the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, where the issue is water quality rather than 
water quantity. A reasonable speculation as to the amount of riparian 
usage statewide would appear to be ten percent of the 31,000,000 million 
acre feet of average annual net water demand. 
Groundwater Rights 
According to the common law, groundwater was allocated by a so-called 
rule of "absolute ownership"--whoever owned the land above the groundwater 
reservoir was entitled to whatever groundwater he or she could pump.l8 In 
fact, however, this was a rule of capture, for there was no protection 
against a neighbor's pumping and drawing away one's groundwater. In any 
event California early abandoned this approach, and in the well-known case 
of Katz v. Walkinshaw in 1903 laid down a series of rules that are 
sometimes referred to as the "doctrine of correlative rights."19 The 
court there provided that the paramount right goes to an overlying owner 
engaged in an overlying use. Such a use must be on the land overlying the 
groundwater basin in question, and another early case indicates that the 
land must be owned by the pumper.20 Thus, technically, a city pumping 
groundwater to irrigate its municipal golf course is exercising an 
overlying right, whereas a city pumping water from the same basin and 
delivering it to residents who own their own parcels is not. In case of 
dispute among the overlyers, the riparian principle is followed: each is 
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entitled to a reasonable share. Furthermore, like riparians, overlyers 
have rights whether these are exercised or not. 
Katz v. Walkinshaw also provided that to the extent there is water 
surplus to the reasonable needs of overlying users, such water is 
available for appropriation. Among appropriators, the "first in time, 
first in right" principle of allocation applies. Thus the basic court 
regime developed at the beginning of this century for groundwater closely 
parallels the California surface water regime. 
It is questionable how practical these rules for groundwater 
allocation are. Most of the major adjudications of groundwater basins 
which have occurred in California have utilized a different principle, 
that of "mutual prescription," which will be discussed below in the 
section on prescriptive water rights. Since a recent decision of the 
California Supreme Court raises serious questions as to whether the 
doctrine of mutual prescription will again be imposed in a groundwater 
adjudication,21 the solutions of Katz v. Walkinshaw are relevant, but seem 
to present serious difficulties, at least for complex basins. Where a 
city pumps water, for example, it may be very difficult to sort out 
overlying uses from appropriative uses or to determine the correct 
priority date for the latter. In many cases of surface water utilization, 
the capacity for diversion was fixed early in time and the use pattern has 
remained relatively constant. For groundwater, however, with pumps being 
added from time to time and the amounts being pumped highly variable and 
dependant on the availability of surface water, there are problems. 
Because groundwater basins typically underly a large number of surface 
parcels, the owners of these parcels are linked in an important way with 
regard to their use of ground water. When one of them pumps from the 
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aquifer, all are to some extent affected. Those among the surface owners 
who pump will receive all the benefit of the use of water, but those who 
do not pump, as well as those who do pump, will be subject to any ensuing 
detriments, such as subsidence of the surface, intrusion of sea water as 
the water table drops or increased energy costs for a longer pumping lift. 
This imbalance of benefits and burdens provides a strong incentive to each 
. 
overlying user--and, to the extent there is a surplus, to any potential 
appropriator--to exploit the resource. Natural resource economists have 
frequently emphasized that in such a "common pool" situation, there is 
every likelihood that the resource in question will be overexploited. 
Approaches to Groundwater Management.--Given this characteristic of 
the groundwater resource, some form of collective or public decision 
making is important. In California, two approaches have been utilized. 
In a few areas water districts have been established and given powers to 
enable them to manage the basin for the common good. Two areas which have 
achieved excellent results through the water district mechanism are Orange 
County and the Santa Clara Valley.22 
A second approach has been adjudication. In Southern California more 
than half a dozen water basins have been adjudicated and presently are 
managed by water masters acting under the jurisdiction of the court.23 As 
is the case with water districts, this allows a lid to be placed on 
aggregate pumping from the basin in particular years in order to avoid 
harmful impacts on all users. 
Cooperation among interested parties is also necessary if the aquifer 
is to be managed as if it were a subsurface reservoir. In recent years 
water resources engineers have been more and more interested in such 
management, which generally is known as "conjunctive use." Conjunctive 
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use means that the surface reservoirs constructed by man are operated in 
tandem with the natural underground reservoirs, so that in dry years more 
is taken from the subsurface sources and in wet years more is taken from 
the surface sources. To many, conjunctive use principles suggest also 
that ground water basins at capacity should be to some extent pumped down 
in order to create storage space for the surplus waters available in wet 
years. 
Fortunately, recent case law in California has greatly strengthened 
the legal basis for conjunctive use management. Two cases deserve 
particular mention. In the Niles case, the Court of Appeal declared that 
land owners are subject to a "public servitude" regarding the water stored 
in aquifers beneath their land.24 In that case a water district had a 
groundwater replenishment program which was designed to conserve local 
runoff, regulate imported water supplies, and prevent salt water 
intrusion. Water put underground by the water district was, however, 
flooding the gravel pits being operated by a private company, and as a 
consequence the company was pumping water out of those pits into the San 
Francisco Bay. In other words, the water district and the private company 
were working at direct cross purposes, the one putting in water which the 
other then pumped out without putting it to any beneficial use. When the 
controversy came to the courts, it was decided that the pumping was not 
reasonable insofar as it interfered with a public servitude which entitled 
the water district to replenish the basin up to the point representing 
"the state of nature." 
The second important case involved a controversy as to water which 
reached groundwater basins in the San Fernando Valley after being brought 
to Southern California from the Owens Valley by the City of Los Angeles. 
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In some cases the City of Los Angeles had directly recharged the aquifers; 
in others, the imported water had been delivered to customers in the San 
Fernando Valley, and a portion of that water had subsequently found its 
way into the groundwater basins. In a case decided in 1975, the Supreme 
Court of California affirmed the right of the importer to recapture water 
which it had added to the groundwater supply of the basin.25 Since 
importing and recapturing water in this fashion is an essential part of 
conjunctive use management, the decision of the court in the San Fernando 
Valley case has been widely hailed as a progressive one. 
Prescriptive Water Rights 
The appropriative and riparian water rights which have been described 
are "rightful," in that an individual acted legitimately in putting water 
to beneficial use or in acquiring a property interest in land sufficient 
to support a riparian water right. Water law, however, like land law 
recognizes that in certain situations wrongful action by an individual may 
also lead to creation of a water right. Such water rights are 
"prescriptive," and they may exist both for surface water and for 
groundwater. Open use adverse to the interest of the rightful user for at 
least five years is required. 
For surface waters, water held subject to an appropriative right is 
subject to prescription if the right dates from before the institution of 
state permit control in 1914. For many years there was controversy as to 
whether a prescriptive right could similarly be acquired as to water 
subject to appropriation after the institution of tne state permit 
system.26 Nothing in the statutory provisions on appropriation speaks 
directly to the question, but it was argued by many that the statutory 
appropriations system was intended to be the exclusive means for 
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initiating a nonriparian water right, and that state supervision of this 
process could not be wholly effective if an "end run" were permitted by 
way of prescription. In a recent decision the California Supreme Court by 
a four-to-three vote agreed.27 
Thus with regard to appropriative surface water rights the role of 
prescription is quite limited. It remains true, however, that riparian 
rights are fully subject to prescription, although in order to act 
wrongfully a prescripter ordinarily must interfere with a reasonable use. 
It is not enough to divert flow which the riparian might claim but is not 
in fact claiming, except in the special case where the prescripter uses 
the water on non-riparian land.28 
In California water rights law, prescription has enjoyed its greatest 
significance with regard to groundwater. In the first of a series of 
important groundwater adjudications in Southern California, the California 
Supreme Court in 1949 announced the doctrine of "mutual" prescription.29 
That adjudication involved one unit of the Raymond Basin in the Pasadena 
area, from which in most years more water was pumped out than went in. In 
other words, the safe yield was being exceeded, so that the basin was in a 
state of permanent overdraft. 
The most enduring part of the decision by the California Supreme Court 
was that aggregate pumping from the basin would have to be limited to the 
safe yield. The question then became: who should be cut back and by how 
much? The court might have employed the principles enunciated in Katz v. 
Walkinshaw, according to which the most junior appropriators would 
initially be cut off, then if necessary the senior appropriators in turn 
would lose their pumping rights, and then the overlyers would be reduced 
until eventually the point of equilibrium was reached. Apparently this 
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result seemed inequitable to the court, for important cities which enjoyed 
merely the status of a junior appropriator would have been entirely cut 
off. 
Instead of following Katz v. Walkinshaw, the court seized on the 
notion of prescription and declared that once overdraft had begun, each 
pumper was acting to an extent prescriptively vis-a-vis the others. Use 
of prescription in such a case seems somewhat artificial, in that 
prescription is rooted in hostile or adverse use, yet in the Pasadena 
situation all pumpers were getting all the water they wanted. The problem 
was that the aggregate impact was adverse to proper long-term management 
of the basin. So far as the individual pumpers were concerned, the impact 
was on the pumping lift, not on taking the water, yet it has never been 
established in California that there is the right to maintenance of a 
fixed pumping lift. 
The doctrine of mutual prescription was used from 1949 to 1975 to 
decide a series of groundwater adjudications, many of which were 
terminated on the basis of a stipulated judgment. In the San Fernando 
decision in 1975, however, the court concluded that there can be no 
prescription against public entities or public utilities engaged in 
groundwater pumping.30 The court based itself on a provision of the civil 
code enacted in 1935,31 but not considered in the Pasadena case since all 
but one of the parties there had stipulated to the judgment and the 
nonstipulating party was a public utility not then covered by the 
statutory language. 
It seems unlikely at the present time the doctrine of mutual 
prescription will be imposed in order to provide equitable solutions to 
groundwater controversies, since it seems most unbalanced to say that 
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public pumpers can acquire prescriptively against private pumpers but not 
the reverse. It should also be noticed that the San Fernando decision 
makes the doctrine of mutual prescription more difficult to apply in other 
ways as well, since there was a tightening up on the notice requirement, 
as well as a redefinition of when aggregate pumping exceeds the 
permissible level. The court at one point also refers to the doctrine of 
"equitable apportionment," previously developed by the United States 
Supreme Court in the context of interstate controversies, and seems to 
suggest that the ultimate objective of any court adjudicating a 
groundwater controversy ought to be an equitable apportionment.32 
Statutorily Adjudicated Rights 
Water rights disputes in California may be resolved by agreement among 
the parties, by an ordinary civil action brought by a water rights 
claimant or by a statutory adjudication.33 A statutory adjudication is an 
administrative proceeding conducted by the State Water Resources Control 
Board ending in a determination of all the rights to water in a particular 
stream system. This determination is filed with a court, which then 
issues a decree defining each water right at to its owner, priority, 
amount, season of use, purpose of use, point of diversion and place of 
use. The decree binds all claimants to water from the stream system in 
question, regardless of whether a particular claimant took part in the 
proceedings. 
As thus stated, a statutory adjudication might appear to be simply a 
procedure for settling water rightssuch as the appropriative, riparian 
and other water rights discussed above. Close examination of past 
practice in statutory adjudications, however, combined with a recent 
legislative change, suggest that in fact it is more accurate to regard the 
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statutorily adjudicated water right as an entity different from the better 
known "classical" water rights. 
Statutory adjudications in California were first authorized by the 
Water Commission Act of 1913. That act was amended, however, in 1917 to 
exclude riparian rights, so the procedure quickly lost its 
comprehensiveness. Furthermore, initially, it was little used -- between 
passage of the statute and 1935, only five statutory adjudications were 
undertaken. 34 
In 1935, the legislation was amended again to include riparian rights, 
so that once more a statutory adjudication could lead to a comprehensive 
settlement of the surface water rights in a stream system.35 Since 1935 
fifteen statutory adjudications have been completed, and currently another 
six statutory adjudications are underway. In each of these proceedings 
the heart of the matter is determination of the validity of water rights 
claims made and grouping of these rights into priority classes. 
Adjudicating Claims.--Once the State Water Resources Control Board has 
determined that it is in the public interest to grant a petition for a 
statutory adjudication, the board makes a detailed investigation of the 
stream system in question and calls for the filing of proofs of claim. 
The investigation is conducted by water rights engineers from the board, 
who examine all existing diversions and uses of water from the stream 
system. Often these engineers live for several months in the community 
where the investigation is being conducted, and they develop considerable 
acquaintance With both the stream and the various water rights Claimants. 
Generally, the claimants themselves in filing their proofs of claim rely 
entirely on the information developed during the board's investigation. 
Once the proofs of claim have been received and a report prepared 
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thereon, the board's engineers prepare a preliminary order of 
determination designed eventually to become a court decree. Although in 
principle this preliminary order is based upon the water rights of the 
various claimants, it is apparent that great weight is given to what 
appear to be the equities of a given situation. The work is done by the 
engineers who did the field investigation, who only occasionally consult 
with the board's lawyers at this stage in the proceeding. 
Extensive recent interviews of board engineers and lawyers involved in 
statutory adjudications together with a detailed review of the files of 
all of these proceedings suggest that many factors play a part in 
preparing preliminary orders of determination.36 The claimed water right 
riparian, appropriative or prescriptive (or, often, "all of the above") 
is the starting point, and, significantly, absent blatent error or a 
challenge from another claimant, the claim is ordinarily accepted at face 
value. This means, for example, that generally board resources are not 
devoted to tasks such as title searches to verify riparian claims and 
investigations to determine the precise moment of initiation of a pre-1914 
appropriative right. Rather the emphasis is placed upon preservation and 
legitimization of the status quo, with a strong presumption in practice 
that someone who has used water for the past five to ten years has a valid 
water right. Heavy reliance is placed on a generalized notion of 
prescription to justify this presumption. Thus a non-riparian who 
initiated a water use after 1914 without benefit of a permit will likely 
be recognized as having a valid water right, the decision in People v. 
Shirokow notwithstanding.37 
Establishing Priority Classes.--Once a list of water rights has been 
prepared, priority classes must be established. Within each class users 
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are treated as having equal and correlative rights, although priority 
dates of appropriative rights may later be resorted to if there is 
insufficient water to satisfy all the users in a given priority class. 
Invariably domestic use, whether active or dormant and regardless of the 
basis of the water right, is placed in the first priority class, on the 
theory this is required by Section 106 of the Water Code: "It is hereby 
declared to be the established policy of this State that the use of water 
for domestic purposes is the highest use of water and that the next 
highest use is for irrigation." This means, for example, that a riparian 
right for irrigation use is placed junior to a later-perfected 
appropriative right for domestic use. Curiously, the same logic 
apparently is not followed to place all rights for water for irrigation in 
a priority class higher than all other non-domestic uses. 
Another important statutory provision used in preparing preliminary 
orders of determination is Water Code § 100, which incorporates the 
reasonable and beneficial use requirements of the state constitution. 
This provision is offered as justification for the practice of placing 
commercial stockwatering use above everything else except domestic use. 
In establishing the priority class placement for rights other than 
those used for domestic use or for commercial stockwatering use, reliance 
in the past has been placed on a whole series of factors: local 
sentiment, the equities as seen by particular board engineers working on 
the statutory adjudication, the desire to effect an optimal pattern of 
water usage (often referred to as the need to find a "physical so1utionn), 
current use, the availability of water, the suitability of unirrigated 
riparian land for irrigation, prior judgments and agreements, 
administrative precedents and ease of administration. Although many of 
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these same factors may in one way or another in fact affect determinations 
made by a court, they seem to be taken into account more explicitly in a 
statutory adjudication. The practice seems to be in accord with the 
"equitable apportionment" which the San Fernando court implied was the 
proper goal of a water rights adjudication.38 It also seems to justify 
the conclusion that in fact the "statutorily adjudicated" water right in 
California is a kind of water right separate and distinct from the 
riparian, appropriative or prescriptive water rights claimed by water 
users at the inception of the proceeding. 
Aside from the equitable origin of the statutorily adjudicated water 
right, differences between the characteristics of this water right and 
either of the principal classical water rights confirm the transformation 
which takes place from filing of proof of claim to issuance of a 
preliminary order of determination. The statutorily adjudicated water 
right is restricted to the place of actual use at the time of the 
adjudication, a characteristic somewhat more restrictive than would be the 
case for a common law riparian right (allowing use of water anywhere on a 
riparian parcel within the watershed) and considerably more restrictive 
than would be the case for a pre-1914 appropriative right (allowing use of 
water anywhere, without regard to parcel lines or watershed boundaries). 
It is similarly restricted as to purpose of use and point of diversion, 
with changes in these allowed only by way of modification of the decree. 
It is quantified, unlike the riparian right. And, by virtue of recently 
enacted Water Code Section 17 45, if awarded after January 1, 1981, it is 
freely transferable, even if riparian in origin. 
Other Water Rights 
The pueblo right, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
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originated in the Spanish and Mexican law. It is the paramount right of 
the city as successor to a pueblo to use water naturally occurring within 
the pueblo limits for the city's inhabitants. Only two cities in 
California, San Diego and Los Angeles, have been recognized by the courts 
as benefitting from pueblo rights,39 although several other coastal cities 
may also qualify as successors to pueblos. In the case of Los Angeles, 
controversies over the city's pueblo right extended nearly a century. 
From the 1880s on, lawsuits questioned the existence and meaning of this 
right.40 In the most recent lawsuit, considerable effort was made to show 
that earlier decisions in favor of Los Angeles had rested on faulty 
historical evidence. The Supreme Court of California, however, decided 
the case in favor of the City of Los Angeles, and the court rested its 
decision heavily upon the fact that Los Angeles had legitimately relied 
upon earlier decisions, whatever their correctness as to the historical 
evidence. 
Another water right of benefit to governments was once thought of 
exclusively as an Indian water right. In 1908 the United States Supreme 
Court enunciated the "Winters Doctrine," to the effect that when the 
United States Congress set aside land in semi-arid portions of the west 
for the settlement of Indians, it must impliedly have set aside sufficient 
water for their needs.41 For many years it was widely assumed that this 
sort of "reading between the lines" to find presumed Congressional intent 
would be done only where the land was reserved for Indian use, but the 
Supreme Court's landmark decision in 1963 i.n Arizona v. California made it 
clear that reserved rights may exist as a matter of federal law for other 
sorts of reservations as well.42 Examples would be wildlife refuges, 
national parks, and national forests. In a recent case the U.S. Supreme 
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Court narrowed the potential for the reserved rights doctrine somewhat by 
distinguishing between primary and secondary uses of federal reserved 
lands and stating that implied water rights are reserved only to service 
the primary uses.43 Nonetheless the doctrine remains an important one, 
and the unquantified and often very uncertain nature of the reserved right 
has periodically concerned state water officials who believe utilization 
of water pursuant to such rights may disrupt the established use regimes. 
Another right benefitting governments is the so-called "navigation 
servitude," which exists under both federal and California law. In its 
federal incarnation, the navigation servitude is based upon regulatory 
power vested in the Congress by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. Under this clause the federal government is permitted to 
regulate commerce among the states or between the states and foreign 
nations. Many years ago the u.s. Supreme Court determined that when such 
commerce clause power is being exercised by the federal government, no 
compensation is owed for injury to private rights, so long as land above 
the high-water mark is not adversely affected.44 Thus, for example, the 
federal government may raise the water level in a navigable stream through 
construction of a dam and need not pay for injury to a hydro-electric 
power facility caused by decrease in the "head," that is, the drop from 
water stored behind the dam to the water below.45 
The California "navigation servitude" of course does not originate in 
the Commerce Clause. It is a creature of state law, and it seems to 
express t:he fundamental proposition that private rights in land or water 
may not be exercised so as to interfere with the public interest in 
navigating upon, fishing in or otherwise taking general advantage of the 
navigable waters of the state.46 Thus, for example, landowners may not 
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interfere with the public use of navigable streams for the purpose of 
floating pleasure craft along them.47 In a case involving the closely 
related "public trust" doctrine, which in California seems to be identical 
to the state navigation servitude, the California Supreme Court noted 
several public purposes to be served in addition to fishing and navigable 
commerce: ecological study, open space and aesthetics were mentioned.48 
The meaning of the public trust doctrine for California water rights 
is now being tested in litigation involving Mono Lake. There, pursuant to 
licenses granted by the State Water Resources Control Board, the City of 
Los Angeles is diverting most of the water which ordinarily would flow 
into Mono Lake, and as a consequence the level of the lake has dropped 
drastically in recent years. The lower lake level in turn has detrimental 
consequences for recreational uses of the lake, for gulls who use an 
island in the lake for nesting purposes, and for other public interests. 
The Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth and others are challenging the 
diversions by the City of Los Angeles, in part on the ground they are in 
violation of the public trust doctrine.49 
Water-Rights Limitations Recognized in California 
Reasonable and Beneficial Use 
California's most important limitation on a water right is found in a 
constitutional amendment which grew out of the continuing tension between 
appropriative and riparian rights. Lux v. Haggin, discussed above,SO 
established that riparian rights are recognized in California and that in 
most cases they are paramount to appropriative rights. By definition, the 
"reasonable share" concept of riparian law means riparians are limited by 
a standard of reasonableness among themselves. Appropriators, on the 
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other hand, are entitled to a quantified amount of water in accordance 
with their respective priorities. But in disputes between a riparian and 
an appropriator, the courts early in this century determined that the 
riparian was limited neither by a standard of reasonableness nor to a 
quantified amount. 
This conclusion caused considerable difficulty for appropriators, and 
in some instances appeared to permit the waste of water in a most dramatic 
fashion. The most notable case was the Herminghaus decision in 1926.51 
Herminghaus, a Miller and Lux lessee on the San Joaquin River operating 
some of the same grazing lands at issue in Lux v. Haggin, claimed that as 
a riparian he was entitled to the full spring flood flow of the river in 
order to boost the water to the point where it became useful to him, even 
though less than one percent of the quantity was actually used for 
irrigation purposes. In litigation with those who wished to appropriate 
water upstream and to store that spring runoff for their own purposes, the 
Supreme Court of California decided for Herminghaus. In addition to 
r~fusing to impose any reasonableness standard on a riparian vis-a-vis an 
appropriator, the court declared that earlier legislation imposing a 
two-and-a-half acre foot per acre maximum on the use of water for 
irrigating uncultivated land was unconstitutional as beyond the police 
power of the state. 
This extreme decision, curious even when evaluated in light of the 
constitutional standards prevailing at that time, led directly to 
amendment of the state constitution. Language was added which was 
intended to extend a reasonableness standard to the Herminghaus situation, 
but the provision is written broadly as a general prohibition of waste. 
The most pertinent language is as follows: 
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The right to water or to the use or flow of 
water in or from any natural stream or water 
course in this state is and shall be limited to 
such water as shall be reasonably required for the 
beneficial use to be served and such right does 
not and shall not extend to the waste or 
unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method 
of diversion of water. California Constitution 
Article 14, § 3, adopted November 6, 1928. 
Renumbered Article 10, § 2, June 8, 1976. 
Although the constitutional amendment clearly states what has become a 
central tenet of Californi.a water rights law, that all use of water must 
be reasonable and beneficial, there is little to guide one in knowing the 
meaning of these vague terms. The courts have been very lenient with 
regard to determinations that a use is "beneficial." Aside from the use 
of water to kill gophers during the winter season,52 most uses have been 
treated as beneficial. The judiciary has been slightly more stringent 
with regard to what is "reasonable," but in general has insisted that 
reasonableness determinations must be made on a case by case basis and do 
not respond to any general formulas. 
A recent leading case on the meaning of reasonableness in the 
constitutional sense is the Joslin case,53 where a riparian sand and 
gravel company had relied on the flow of a stream to transport rock, sand 
and gravel to its site. When an upstream water district built a dam which 
prevented the continued flow of the building materials, the company sued 
for damages. The company lost, for the California Supreme Court concluded 
that its use of water was not reasonable vis-a-vis the competing use of 
the water district. The opinion seems impliedly to provide an analysis of 
the comparative utility of the competing uses, although it is once again 
stated that such determinations are made on a case by case basis. The 
court stated that broad public policy considerations played a major role 
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in its decision. It noted, for example, that "statewide considerations of 
transcendent importance" suggest that water is in short supply whereas 
building materials are not.54 Perhaps the best conclusion is that the 
constitutional amendment stands today as something of a sleeping giant, 
which may be awakened in future years as water grows shorter in supply and 
the interest in water conservation increases. 
The Permit and License System 
Another means by which water rights are limited is the permit and 
license system operated by the State of California for appropriation of 
surface water from 1914 on. Administrative control of such appropriations 
was recommended by the Conservation Commission in its report of 1912,55 
was initiated by the Water Commission Act of 1913 and was approved by the 
people in a referendum held in 1914.56 Interestingly enough, the 
Conservation Commission noted that there should also be a statutory system 
for regulating percolating groundwater, but stated that it had not had the 
time to study groundwater problems in sufficient detail to recommend a 
statute.57 
A major concern of the Conservation Commission was to make effective 
the beneficial use limit which already existed for appropriative rights. 
It was feared that large interests such as power companies would hoard 
water and that in practice there was no way of enforcing beneficial use. 
There was no central agency who knew who the appropriators were, what 
their rights were or whether the rights were being properly exercised. 
All this has changed since 1914 through the development of a certain 
measure of administrative control. The administrative function, now 
performed by the State Water Resources Control Board, provides review of 
applications to appropriate unappropriated water, including examination of 
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the question whether the vested rights of others will be adversely 
affected. Permits are issued which allow the diversion of water, and upon 
completion of the construction of water diversion projects a second step 
occurs when a license is issued. Generally conditions are placed in both 
the permits and the licenses, some of them merely repetitions of statutory 
and constitutional requirements, others tailor-made to fit a particular 
situation.58 In any event, these provisions do limit the exercise of 
water rights, and violation of one of the provisions could lead to 
revocation of a right. 
In general the administrative controls are tightest at the time when 
the application is being processed. Once the license has been issued, 
there appears to be little review by the State Water Resources Control 
Board, absent a complaint. 
It should be noted that any limitations found in permits are much less 
easy to enforce if the permit is held by a federal agency. The key test 
case in recent years has been State of California v. United States, 
involving the New Melones Dam on the Stanislaus River. In this case the 
authority of the State of California to impose terms and conditions on the 
permits issued to a federal agency for operation of the dam was 
challenged. There is no question but that the federal government has the 
constitutional right to ignore any terms and conditions imposed by a 
state, but in Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 Congress directed 
that state law be observed in certain respects in reclamation projects. 
In a recent decision the United States Supreme Court, in what appears to 
be a modification of its views on the meaning of Section 8, stated that 
California may impose terms and conditions to the extent they are not 
inconsistent with a clear Congressional directive.59 Thus terms and 
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conditions may be imposed on federal permittees, but for each one the 
question may be asked whether or not the provision conflicts with a clear 
Congressional directive.60 
Partial Eclipse of Classical Water Rights in California 
Thus far the various water rights historically recognized in 
California have been discussed, as well as certain limitations on these 
rights. In certain parts of the state, however, these classical water 
rights have been largely eclipsed by the use of other arrangements for the 
allocation of water. Typically this occurs where a large water 
development project has been constructed, water in massive quantities 
appropriated by the constructing agency, and arrangements of a consensual 
nature made to distribute the water appropriated. 
The first of these major projects was the Central Valley Project,61 
initially planned by the State of California during the 1920s. Inspired 
by the success of the City of Los Angeles in moving large quantities of 
water from the Owens Valley to the Southern California coastal plain, the 
state developed plans to move large amounts of water from the high runoff 
area of the Sacramento Valley to the lower runoff but more intensively 
farmed area of the San Joaquin Valley. Because of the Depression, 
however, it proved impossible for the State of California to finance this 
project, and it was turned over to the federal government. 
The Central Valley Project was constructed by the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902, and it involves the 
wholesaling of water by the Bureau to irrigation districts who retail the 
water to the ultimate customers. Although the Bureau of Reclamation holds 
appropriative rights to allow its diversions, for example at Shasta Dam on 
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the upper Sacramento River, its relationships with the water districts are 
governed by contract. Elaborate contracts, ordinarily for at least 40 
years in duration, determine the price and availability of water. They 
also incorporate certain federal statutory requirements such as the excess 
land limitation, which places a ceiling on land ownership by those 
receiving water at heavily subsidized prices. The districts themselves 
are specialized forms of local government which have service obligations 
to those within their boundaries. These obligations are based not" on 
contract, but rather on the status of the recipients. A farmer receiving 
water from a local irrigation district, which in turn has purchased the 
water from the Bureau of Reclamation, is thus far from the position of the 
classical appropriator or riparian user. 
Similar arrangements exist for the State Water Project,62 planned 
after World War II and still not completely constructed. In this case the 
appropriator is the California Department of Water Resources, which has 
constructed facilities throughout the state, including those necessary to 
pump water over the Tehachapi Mountains into Southern California. The 
Department of Water Resources distributes its water pursuant to contracts 
entered into with various water agencies or water districts, which in turn 
retail the water to ultimate consumers. 
Significance of Water Rights for 
Water Management in California 
The existence of diverse types of water rights has not prevented 
comprehensive water management in particular instances. The Central 
Valley Project, the State Water Project and the management programs 
established for several important groundwater basins demonstrate that 
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integrated management can be achieved in California, although it is 
difficult to know how much less costly and more efficient the development 
of these programs might have been if the water rights system had been 
simpler. These projects, of course, do not provide comprehensive water 
management for California as a whole indeed, often in recent years 
there has been direct conflict between one program and another. Given the 
pol~tical realities of a federal governmental system, of powerful water 
agencies established at the local and regional levels, and of the 
different values and objectives of the public and private entities holding 
water rights, a single statewide water management program is out of the 
question. 
There are, however, three matters as to which progress may occur. Of 
most importance is the question of groundwater management. When 
California chose in 1913 not to include percolating groundwater in the 
regulatory system established by the Water Commission Act, it departed 
from the pattern followed in most western states. Although groundwater 
and surface water form part of a single hydrologic cycle, public interest 
regulation was introduced for only one portion. Consequently, surface 
streams are to some extent protected against overdrafting, because 
applications to appropriate unappropriated water may be denied where 
necessary to protect beneficial instream uses, but protection against 
overdrafting of groundwater basins is provided only sporadically through 
the occasional water district management program or adjudication decree. 
In a report submitted at the end of 1978~ the Governor's Commission to 
Review California Water Rights Law drew attention to this problem and 
recommended the adoption of a state policy aimed at the eventual 
elimination of overdraft in most situations.63 It was recommended further 
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that local governments be given the primary responsibility for achieving 
this goal, with a review responsibility assigned to state government.64 
The topic is politically volatile, particularly among farmers, many of 
whom oppose any governmental interference with their present freedom in 
most parts of California to pump unlimited quantities of groundwater. 
Many farmers believe the appropriate response to continued overdrafting of 
groundwater basins, which in some parts of the southern San Joaquin Valley 
has become extremely serious, is to construct more dams on the northern 
rivers, including those presently protected by the Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act. 
A New Groundwater Management Proposal 
The "Water Resources Conservation and Efficiency Act," an initiative 
measure which proponents are attempting to qualify for the November 1982 
ballot, deals with the groundwater management issue more narrowly than did 
the Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law. This 
initiative measure, included in full for reference as Appendix A, adopts 
as state policy the management of groundwater so as to avoid long-term 
overdraft, land subsidence, water quality degradation and other 
significant environmental harm. It states that local economies shall be 
built and sustained on reliable, long-term water supplies and not upon 
long-term overdraft as a source of water supply. But the operational 
language to implement these goals is confined to the eleven groundwater 
basins identified by the Department of Water Resources as currently 
critically overdrafted.65 For these basins local entities are called upon 
to establish a groundwater management authority, which in turn is mandated 
to develop a groundwater management program to be approved by the State 
Water Resources Control Board. No provision is made for state management 
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of the groundwater resources of these basins in the event local entities 
fail to fulfill their responsibilities. The initiative measure does 
state, however, that, absent board approval of a groundwater management 
program, one year after the effective date of the legislation no land 
within the critical groundwater overdraft area in question shall be 
irrigated if it lacks a recent irrigation history. Thus where local areas 
fail to deal effectively with groundwater overdraft by the assumption of 
management responsibility as contemplated by the initiative measure, there 
at least would be a prohibition against making matters worse by irrigating 
land without a recent irrigation history. 
Instream Flow Preservation 
A second issue for the future is preservation of instream flows. The 
State Water Resources Control Board presently has considerable authority 
to refuse or condition permits to appropriate surface waters in order to 
protect instream flows for purposes such as recreation and fishing.66 It 
may lack, however, the authority to develop any adequate comprehensive 
regulatory scheme for a particular stream aimed at preservation of 
instream flows,67 and it also apparently lacks the authority to grant 
appropriative water rights for instream uses not involving control akin to 
possession.68 The Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights 
Law took the position that it would be inadvisable to grant the authority 
to approve permanent instream water rights, because the interests being 
protected are diffuse and essentially public in nature.69 The Commission 
however recommended that authority to develop cQmprehensive instream flow 
regulations be explicitly granted by the legislature to the State Water 
Resources Control Board,70 although to date such a grant has not occurred. 
On the instream flow protection question, the Water Resources 
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Conservation and Efficiency Act departs somewhat from the approach 
supported by the Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights 
Law. The act endorses the notion that the State Water Resources Control 
Board should have clear authority to establish instream flow protection 
standards. But it also provides for the permanent appropriation of water 
for instream uses without the necessity for physical control, provided 
that the State Water Resources Control Board finds such appropriation to 
be in the public interest and otherwise in accordance with existing law. 
Furthermore, it requires that where conventional appropriations impact 
adversely on fish and wildlife dependent on instream flows, conditions to 
offset those impacts be imposed upon permittees. 
Under the general heading of instream flow protection, the Water 
Resources Conservation and Efficiency Act also includes measures on the 
filling program for the reservoir created by New Melones Dam on the 
Stanislaus River. This dam, one of the most controversial ever to be 
built in California, has been built and is operated by federal agencies, 
so that any limitations imposed by state law must consider delicate 
questions of state-federal relations.71 Insofar as the initiative measure 
would limit the federal agencies, the provisions generally correspond to 
those imposed by the State Water Resources Control Board. The initiative 
measure also, however, imposes limitations on entities contracting for 
water from the New Melones Project, including subdivisions of the state 
such as water districts. These subdivisions -- arguably within the zone 
of state activities ill1IIll.lfl.e fr01Il federal 1ntrusion72 ~- are prohibited from 
entering into contracts for New Melones Project water unless (1) the 
contracts are conditional upon 75% of the firm yield of the project being 
contracted for and (2) the contracts use a pricing formula which would 
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eliminate a large part of the massive subsidy characteristic of federal 
water projects. 
~-later Conservation 
The final topic which is bound to be of increased concern as the years 
go by is water conservation. It has been noted above that the 
constitutional amendment of 1928 lays down a broad antiwaste standard, 
with considerable potential for developmen~ by the courts.73 There are, 
however, particular ways in which the water rights system works against 
conservation, for example by requiring continued beneficial use for 
maintenance of a water right. Additionally some groups have suggested 
recently that new water should not be available to importing areas until 
they have demonstrated an adequate commitment to use of available water 
conservation practices. Again, however, the legislature has been 
unreceptive to such urgings.74 
The Water Conservation and Efficiency Act discussed above approaches 
water conservation by imposing requirements only where there are 
interbasin transfers of water of more than 20,000 acre-feet of water per 
year. Water suppliers or contractors engaged in such interbasin transfers 
would be required by the initiative measure to prepare and submit to the 
State Water Resources Control Board by January 1, 1985, a water 
conservation program. Furthermore, after the effective date of the 
legislation no new or increased interbasin transfer would be permitted 
until the board had determined that an adequate water conservation program 
had been prepared and w.as being adequately implemented. 
Toward a Political Consensus on Water Law Reform75 
The experience of the Governor's Commission to Review California Water 
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Rights Law, and that of a parallel effort in Arizona, illustrate both the 
difficulty of creating a future that could command the support of 
Californians and the ways in which those difficulties could be overcome. 
Although some of the commission's minor recommendations have been enacted 
into law,76 the commission's principal recommendations on groundwater 
management and instream flow protection have never come close to 
legislative approval. 
No Consensus in California 
Four general reasons eKplain the failure to achieve a political 
consensus in favor of the commission's proposals. First, the general 
political climate is inhospitable to the kinds of changes proposed by the 
commission. At a time when the popular mood favors less government and 
lower taxes, as represented in Washington by limited deregulation and in 
California by Proposition 13, the commission recommended more government, 
particularly in proposing groundwater regulation for those overdrafted 
basins (notably in the southern part of the San Joaquin Valley) not now 
subject to effective district control or to court decrees. At a time when 
the environmental movement has been put on the defensive, the commission 
recommended more environmental protection, particularly in proposing 
strengthened instream flow preservation. And at a time with a crowded 
political agenda and popular fatigue with many recurring issues, the 
commission recommended changes which command little grassroots 
understanding or committed support, but which generate intense opposition 
from directly affected interest groups such as farmers. 
Second, the commission's membership and mandate were organized in a 
way that made political success very difficult. Tne sponsor of the 
commission, who chaired the State Water Resources Control Board, initially 
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conceived of the commission as a nonpartisan, independent and expert group 
which would make recommendations of a "technical" nature -- something like 
those provided by the California Law Revision Commission. Consequently, 
no legislators were appointed to the commission, members were asked to 
serve as individuals rather than as representatives of interest groups, 
and lawyers with interested parties as clients were included only as a 
result of outside pressure. A distinguished and competent group of 
commission members was ultimately assembled, but the assumption that the 
key decisions could be treated as technical ones by impartial experts, 
rather than as highly political ones requiring interest-group compromises, 
proved untenable. The decisions, such as whether to have increased 
groundwater management and the respective roles of state and local 
governments in such management, were political, but the political gears 
had not been greased. The commission itself lacked political power, the 
various interest groups were not directly involved in the bargaining 
process, and the commission had no powerful political patron. It was 
gubernatorial in name only. Aside from one press conference given upon 
receipt of the commission's final report, the governor did virtually 
nothing to advance the commission's proposals. And the commission lacked 
effective political ties to the legislature, in marked contrast to the 
situation a decade earlier when substantial revisions in California's 
water quality law had been made. 
Furthermore, the commission's mandate was probably stated too narrowly 
to allow for ~lit:ieal eonsensus. Directed to study Cali.fornia water 
rights law, staff and members of the commission believed it was beyond the 
scope of their charge to examine either the law or current state policy 
concerning water development projects. Yet, as noted above, many interest 
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groups believe more such projects are needed and regard any effort to 
improve the management of existing water supplies as implicitly suggesting 
that additional supplies should not be developed. Thus, groups such as 
the Association of California Water Agencies, the California Farm Bureau 
Federation, and the California Chamber of Commerce, which favor further 
water construction projects, took strong positions against the 
recommendations for improved management. 
In contrast, environmental groups such as the Planning and 
Conservation League and public interest groups such as the League of Women 
Voters generally supported the recommendations. However, the commission 
believed it lacked a mandate which would allow examination of a 
comprehensive approach involving a mixture of management changes and 
development projects. Nor did the Brown Administration see fit to link in 
any way the commission's management recommendations, which it nominally 
supported, with the development proposals it supported with great vigor. 
A third reason for the commission's lack of political success was its 
inability to generate broad public support. There was no crisis, such as 
the Santa Barbara oil spill, which a decade earlier sparked federal 
concern over oil pollution of water. The drought, which had led to the 
commission's creation, ended before doing serious harm to either the 
economic well-being or the lifestyle of most Californians. The commission 
had among its members no well-known figure who could draw attention to its 
work, as Pardee, the popular ex-governor, had done with respect to the 
work of the Conservation Commission• 77 Other than the ·anadremous fishery 
losses which are associated with water development projects, it was 
difficult to build a dramatic and convincing factual case that business-
as-usual would cause any significant harm to the general public. The 
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threat of federal action suggested by the early work of the Carter 
Administration on a new national water policy soon lost credibility. And 
the commission itself was unable to achieve unanimity, which may qave had 
an adverse political effect. 
A final reason for the political defeat, at least initially, of the 
commission's proposals was the misfortune of having its key proponents 
within the executive and legislative branches either removed or seriously 
weakened at critical junctures. The chair of the State Water Resources 
Control Board, who sponsored the commission - and was a highly articulate 
spokesman for its views and the executive branch official most thoroughly 
committed to pursuit of the recommended changes - was appointed to another 
state position, out of the mainstream of water politics, just before the 
commission's proposals came before the legislature. And the speaker of 
the assembly, who repeatedly had spoken publicly and forcefully in favor 
of the commission's general approach to water policy, was embroiled in a 
devastating leadership battle just as the commission's proposals were 
being considered in committee. 
Why Arizona Succeeded 
The immediate failure of the Governor's Commission does not 
necessarily mean that political consensus will never emerge; recent events 
in Arizona attest to that. This state radically revised its original law 
in 1980, to provide for state management of groundwater aimed at limiting 
pumping to "safe yield" in the three overdrawn areas projected to contain 
major urban populations by the year 2025.78 Pump taxes, the permanent 
retirement of irrigated land, prohibitions on the development of 
subdivided land without a water supply assured for at least 100 years, and 
mandatory conservation measures -- including continued reductions in per 
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capita use -- are all provided for in new legislation which passed the 
Arizona legislature by an overwhelming margin.79 
The dramatic changes in Arizona are but the latest step in a 
controversy over groundwater overdrafting in that state which goes back at 
least to 1938.80 Several commissions have addressed the problem and, in 
fact, reform legislation which eventually proved ineffective was passed in 
1948. But as recently as 1979, the commission then appointed to study the 
problem seemed stalemated. However, in a few short months political 
consensus was achieved. 
Several factors appear to have contributed to the ability of this 
neighboring state to accomplish that which has proved so elusive in 
California. First, it was evidently clear to all that with construction 
of the Central Arizona Project (CAP), no significant water development 
projects remain to be built; there is no longer a realistic prospect of 
water development projects in the Pacific Northwest for the benefit of the 
lower Colorado basin. Thus, interest groups such as mining firms and 
cities were forced to look to reallocation of existing supplies to get 
more water. Second, a court decision in 1976 threw into question the 
validity of even intrabasin transfers of water,81 much less interbasin 
transfers. Third, when the public process of debate within the special 
blue-ribbon commission on groundwater appeared ineffective, a private 
process of bargaining among representatives of three key interest groups 
--mining, cities, and agriculture-- began. Fourth, Arizona's governor 
personally spent hundreds ofhours involved in these private·negotiations, 
underscoring the enormous importance of a solution for the future of the 
state. Fifth, at crucial junctures the United States Secretary of the 
Interior threatened dire consequences, such as a construction slowdown on 
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the Central Arizona Project or allocations of CAP water in a way 
unfavorable to non-Indian interests, if an adequate groundwater management 
law was not forthcoming. The governor was able to make effective use of 
these threats, to force the negotiating interests to reach a compromise 
solution. 
It is impossible to know whether the Arizona groundwater management 
statute will be held valid by the courts, will be preserved in its present 
form by the legislature, or will prove to be effective in practice. The 
statute is now being tested in litigation challenging its 
consititutionality,82 and recently the construction and financing 
industries --not, it should be noted, groups which had participated in 
the private negotiating process described above -- succeeded in having 
some modifications in the legislation enacted.83 Nonetheless, the mere 
fact that the Arizona groundwater management statute was adopted is 
impressive proof that a political consensus among deeply antagonistic 
forces can achieve major changes in the management of water. 
Lessons for California 
Despite obvious differences between the two states, several lessons 
for California may be drawn from the Arizona experience. First, consensus 
for serious management reforms may be achievable only when further major 
water development projects appear untenable to the water industry. In the 
context of California, this may occur only when the North Coast rivers 
appear as beyond reach as did the Pacific Northwest rivers to Arizona --
either because the costs of development make it unt.h.:i..nk.able or because 
political limits appear effectively to have placed these rivers 
indefinitely out of bounds. Second, political consensus may be possible 
only with some interest-group realignment, so that groups with 
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long-standing stakes in the state's water resources decide to shift their 
position to support management reform. The most likely candidate for such 
a decision appears to be urban interests. If, for example, the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California were greatly to 
increase its emphasis on improved management and reallocation of developed 
water supplies, which might permit a moderation of its development 
policies, the political ramifications could be profound. The Arizona 
experience suggests that direct interest-group bargaining may be more 
efficacious than the usual commission study/legislative debate route. 
Finally, fortuitous factors, such as sustained federal pressure, or 
inspired gubernatorial leadership, could play an important part in 
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APPENDIX A 
INITIATIVE MEASURE PROPOSED FOR NOVEMBER 1982 BALLOT 
DIVISION 8. WATER RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND EFFICIENCY ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL DECLARATIONS AND POLICY 
15000. This division shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Water Resources Conservation and Efficiency Act." 
15001. The people of the State of California find and declare as 
follows: 
(a) The waters of the state are a limited resource subject to 
ever increasing demands. 
(b) Conservation and the efficient management of water resources 
are necessary to meet the competing needs of urban communities, industry, 
agriculture, and recreation. 
15002. In order to promote balanced development and preservation 
of water resources for the benefit of present and future generations of 
Californians, the people of the State of California further find and 
declare as follows: 
(a) Cost-effective methods of water conservation shall be 
promoted. 
(b) Water development and use shall conserve water in rivers, 
streams and lakes for fishing, recreation, wildlife support, water quality 
control, and related purposes. 
(c) The Stanislaus River Canyon is an historical, geological, 
and natural treasure. At the present time, filling the New Melones 
Reservoir to a moderate level is an effective compromise that will provide 
for irrigation, flood control, power generation, and water quality 
enhancement, while preserving the natural and recreational qualities of 
the canyon. 
(d) Underground water is a shared resource. Successful 
groundwater management programs, such as those of Los Angeles, Orange, 
Riverside, San Bernardino, and Santa Clara Counties, and other areas of 
the state, should be adapted to those parts of California known to have 
critically overdrafted groundwater basins. 
PART 2. WATER EFFICIENCY AND CONSERVATION 
15100. It is the policy of the State of California that: 
(a) Conservation and the efficient use of water shall be 
vigorously pursued to protect both the people of the state and their water 
resources. 
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(b) Economic efficiency in water allocation and use requires 
that those who receive water from a water project pay their full 
proportionate share of the costs of developing and delivering that water; 
that subsidies shall be discouraged; that the use of property taxes to pay 
for any cost of water development or delivery shall be minimized; and that 
property taxes shall be phased out for payment of such costs associated 
with developed water supplies. 
(c) Efficiency also requires that additional water importation 
be considered only where economically competitive water conservation 
programs are developed and implemented in the importing area. 
15101. As used in this part: 
(a) "Basin" means a hydrologic study area described in 
Department of Water Resources Bulletin 160-74; except that, for the 
purposes of this part, the Sacramento Basin and the Delta-Central Sierra 
Basin shall be deemed a single hydrol?gic basin. 
(b) "Interbasin transfer" means the transfer of water for use in 
a basin other than the basin in which the source of the water is located. 
(c) "Public agency" means (1) any state or federal agency; and 
(2) any city, city and county, county, or district organized, existing, 
and acting pursuant to the laws of this state. 
15102. Every water supplier of, or contractor with the state or 
federal government for, more than 20,000 acre-feet of water per year, 
engaged in or contracting for the interbasin transfer of water on the 
effective date of this division, regardless of the basis of water right, 
shall on or before January 1, 1985, prepare and submit to the board a 
water conservation program as provided in Section 15104. After the 
effective date of this division, no such supplier or contractor shall make 
a new or increased interbasin transfer of water, regardless of the basis 
of water right, unless and until an adequate water conservation program 
has been prepared and is being adequately implemented, as determined by 
the Board. 
15103. An application to appropriate more than 20,000 acre-feet 
of water involving an interbasin transfer of water shall include a water 
conservation program as provided in Section 15104. Any permit or license 
issued by the board for an appropriation of water to which this section 
applies shall contain a condition requiring the continued satisfactory 
implementation of the water conservation program. 
15104. The water conservation program shall be consistent with 
the policies in this division, and shall :i.dendfy a11 reasonable wafer 
supply alternatives, including, but not limited to (1) water conservation 
and other practices to achieve greater efficiency in water use, (2) waste 
water reclamation, (3) improved water management practices, including 
groundwater management and conjunctive use of ground and surface waters 
consistent with any groundwater management program adopted pursuant to 
Part 4 of this division (commencing with Section 15300), (4) any pricing 
and rate structure change which would result in water conservation, (5) 
banking of water supplies for use in water deficient years, (6) interbasin 
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and intrabasin transfers of developed water supplies, and (7) inbasin 
conventional water supply development. Any measure which would 
substantially impair significant wetlands shall not be deemed a reasonable 
water supply alternative. The water conservation program shall include, 
but not be limited to, a comparison of costs and a plan for implementation 
of alternatives. Where implementation of a water conservation program, or 
a portion thereof, will cost less on a marginal-cost basis than 
importation of additional supplies, the program, or portion thereof, shall 
be implemented prior to commencing additional importation projects. 
Implementation of alternatives shall include adoption of all necessary 
ordinances or regulations. 
15105. Any public agency, water supplier or water contractor 
shall have the power to use any existing financing authority to implement 
a water conservation program as described in Section 15104. 
15106. (a) No provision of this part shall be construed to 
endorse, require, or prohibit the construction, maintenance, or use of the 
facility authorized by subdivision (a) of Section 11255 (as added by 
Chapter 632, Statutes of 1980 (S.B. 200)), if Chapter 632 is effective. 
(b) Nothing in this section shall affect any obligation of any 
person or entity under the California Environmental Quality Act (Division 
13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Public Resources Code). 
PART 3. INSTREAM PROTECTION 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
15200. (a) It is the purpose and intent of this part to 
conserve a reasonable amount of water in the streams, rivers, lakes, bays, 
estuaries, and wetlands of the state for the benefit of present and future 
generations of Californians. 
(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state that 
instream uses of water be given due consideration in the state's water 
rights permit and license system. 
15201. Water may be appropriated for reasonable and beneficial 
instream uses, including, but not limited to, fishery and water-related 
wildlife uses and recreational, aesthetic, scientific, scenic, and water 
quality uses in the same manner as water is appropriated for other uses 
pursuant to Part 2 (commencing with Section 1200) of Division 2. 
15202. The appropriation of water pursuant to this part does not 
require thediversi~m arany other form of physical control of the water 
appropriated. No change in place of use by an appropriator under Chapter 
10 (commencing with Section 1700) of Part 2 of Division 2 shall be allowed 
for any appropriation of water for instream use, nor shall the right to 
appropriate water for instream uses create in the appropriator any right 
to exclude others from any beneficial, reasonable instream use of that 
water which is consistent with and does not impair the use for which the 
water is appropriated. 
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15203. Whenever an applicant for a permit to appropriate water 
pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200) proposes a project 
or proposes the appropriation of water which may have an adverse impact on 
instream uses, the board shall allow the appropriation only upon the 
condition that the permittee implement measures to offset those impacts. 
The board shall reserve jurisdiction with respect to the provisions of any 
condition included in a permit or a license subject to this section. 
15204. The board may establish instream flow protection 
standards to implement this part, provided that no such standards shall 
impair vested water rights. 
CHAPTER 2. STANISLAUS RIVER 
15225. In order to prevent the waste, unreasonable use, or 
unreasonable method of diversion of water, as provided in Section 2 of 
Article X of the California Constitution, the impoundment of water behind 
New Melones Dam on the Stanislaus River, except as required for (1) 
satisfaction of vested rights, (2) releases to preserve and enhance fish 
and wildlife, (3) releases for water quality control purposes, (4) flood 
control purposes, and (5) generation of hydroelectric power only to the 
extent that the water is stored and released for one or more of the four 
purposes listed above, shall be prohibited until the project operator has 
entered into long-term water service contracts for specific municipal, 
industrial, or agricultural uses representing at least 75 percent of the 
firm yield of the New Melones Project, as determined by the board. 
15226. No person, state agency, subdivision of the state, 
state-regulated agency, or entity organized under the laws of the State of 
California shall enter into any contract for the purpose and delivery of 
water from the New Melones Project unless the contract provides for the 
payment by the purchaser of the purchaser's proportionate share of both of 
the following: 
(a) All operation, maintenance, and delivery costs for the New 
Melones Project and related conveyance facilities during the term of the 
contract; and 
(b) The construction costs of the New Melones Project without 
subsidy from other facilities or other water users. 
15227. For the purposes of Section 15226, "cost," means the cost 
as allocated to water supply elements of the New Melones Project when the 
Water and Power Resources Service (now the Bureau of Reclamation) of the 
United States Department of Interior assumed responsibility for the 
proJect !rom fhel.:Jiiitea statesAfmyCorps··ofEngineers on November 20; 
1979. 
15228. Any person, state agency, subdivision of the state, 
state-regulated agency, or entity organized under the laws of the State of 
California entering into an agreement for the purchase and delivery of 
water from the New Melones Dam Project shall condition its agreement to 
provide that the agreement shall not be in full force and effect until 
long-term water service contracts are signed representing 75 percent of 
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the firm yield of the New Melones Project. 
15229. In complying with the terms of this chapter, the board 
shall, to the extent possible, restrict storage of water in the New 
Melones Reservoir to the area downstream of Parrott's Ferry Bridge, 808 
feet above mean sea level. 
PART 4. GROUNDWATER RESOURCES CONSERVATION 
CHAPTER 1. FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 
15300. The people of the State of California find and declare 
all of the following: 
(a) Conditions of critical groundwater overdraft currently exist 
in several areas of the state, adversely affecting water resources 
throughout the entire state. 
(b) Local groundwater resources shall be managed to avoid 
conditions of long-term overdraft, land subsidence, water quality 
degradation, and other significant environmental harm. 
(c) Local economies shall be built and sustained on reliable, 
long-term water supplies and not upon long-term overdraft as a source of 
water supply. 
15301. The people, however, recognize that, in certain areas, 
long-term overdraft cannot immediately be eliminated without causing 
severe economic loss and hardship. In those areas, the groundwater 
management programs provided for in this part shall include all reasonable 
measures, consistent with the policies and provisions of this division, to 
prevent a further increase in the amount of long-term overdraft and to 
accomplish continuing reduction in long-term overdraft. 
CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS 
15310. As used in this part: 
(a) "Groundwater" means water beneath the surface of the earth 
within the zone below the water table in which the soil is completely 
saturated with water. Groundwater does not include water subject to the 
existing permit and license system administered by the board. 
(b) "Local entity" means any city, city and county, or county. 
Local entity also means any public utility, mutual water company, or 
general or special district or agency, provided it is authorized to 
acquire, develop, replenish, or otherwise manage or regulate water 
supplies. Any member entity of a district, agency, or authority, 
including a joint powers authority, shall also be considered a local 
entity for the purposes of this part. 
(c) "Long-term overdraft" means the condition of a groundwater 
basin in which the average annual amount of water extracted for a period 
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of five years or more exceeds the average annual supply of water for that 
period to the basin, plus any temporary surplus. 
CHAPTER 3. CRITICAL GROUNDWATER OVERDRAFT AREAS 
15320. The following groundwater basins identified in Department 
of Water Resources Bulletin 118-80 are hereby declared to be critical 
groundwater overdraft areas and shall establish groundwater management 
authorities and otherwise comply with the provisions of this part: (a) 
Santa Cruz-Pajaro Basin; (b) Cuyama Valley Basin; (c) Ventura County 
Basin; (d) Eastern San Joaquin County Basin; (e) Chowchilla Basin; (f) 
Madera Basin; (g) Kings Basin; (h) Kaweah Basin; (i) Tulare Lake Basin; 
(j) Tule Basin; and (k) Kern County Basin. 
CHAPTER 4. GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES 
15330. Within one year after the effective date of this 
division, the local entities within a critical groundwater overdraft area 
designated in Section 15320 shall identify a responsible authority to 
carry out the groundwater management requirements of this part and shall 
transmit their nomination to the board. The board shall designate the 
authority nominated by the local entities as the groundwater management 
authority for the area unless an objection is filed with the board by a 
local entity in the area within 60 days after the transmittal of the 
nomination to the board. 
15331. In making their nomination pursuant to Section 15330, the 
local entities in a critical groundwater overdraft area shall nominate one 
of the following from their area, as the responsible groundwater 
management authority for their area: (a) a local entity which is a public 
agency, (b) a joint powers authority organized under Chapter 5 (commencing 
with Section 6500) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code, or (c) 
a groundwater management district organized pursuant to law, if and when 
such a law is enacted. 
15332. If, one year after the effective date of this division, 
the local entities within a designated critical groundwater overdraft area 
have not nominated a responsible authority as provided for in Section 
15330 and 15331, or an objection to the nomination has been properly filed 
with the board, the board shall, after notice and opportunity for hearing, 
expeditiously determine whether any existing public local entity can 
effectively serve as the groundwater management authority for the area. 
Where the determination is made in the affirmative, the board shall 
d~s;i~ll.(it~CiJ?ublic local entity as the groundwater management authority 
for the area. · 
15333. If, pursuant to Section 15332, the board determines that 
no existing public local entity can effectively serve as the groundwater 
management authority, the board shall provide notice of the determination 
to all local entities within the area. Upon receipt of the notice, the 
local entities within the area shall, within 180 days, create a joint 
powers authority for the purposes of meeting the groundwater management 
requirements of this part, which authority shall be designated by the 
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board. 
15334. Any groundwater management authority designated by the 
board pursuant to this part may exercise, as appropriate, any of the 
powers set forth in (a) the Orange County Water District Act (Chapter 924, 
Statutes of 1933 as amended on or before the effective date of this 
division), (b) the Sierra Valley Groundwater Basin Act (Chapter 449, 
Statutes of 1980), or (c) future legislation authorizing additional powers 
for groundwater management authorities. In addition, any such authority 
shall have the power to limit, control, or prohibit extraction of 
groundwater within the groundwater management area to respond to 
conditions of long-term overdraft, subsidence, water quality degradation, 
significant environmental harm, well interference, or the threat of any of 
those conditions. 
CHAPTER 5. LOCAL GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
15340. Not later than two years after a groundwater management 
authority is designated, the authority shall adopt a groundwater 
management program for the area. 
15341. (a) Each groundwater management program shall include a 
detailed statement of groundwater management objectives. These objectives 
shall include, but shall not be limited to, all of the following: 
(1) Reduction of water demand by means of water conservation, 
waste water reclamation, and other means. 
(2) Preservation and improvement of water quality by means of 
soil and drainage management. 
(3) Effective use of the storage capacity of the groundwater 
basins. 
(4) Maintenance of groundwater supplies to provide water for 
wetlands. 
(b) Groundwater management objectives shall be consistent with 
the policies and provisions set forth in this division. 
15342. Each groundwater management program shall include a plan 
of implementation for achieving the groundwater management objectives 
stated. The plan of implementation shall describe the actions necessary 
to achieve the groundwater management objectives stated and set a time 
schedule for each action to be taken. 
15343. Groundwater management programs shall be reviewed 
periodically and may be revised. Any revision of a groundwater management 
program shall be subject to all the requirements for the adoption of an 
initial groundwater management program. 
15344. A groundwater management program or a revision of a 
program shall not become effective unless and until, after notice and 
opportunity for hearing, it is approved by the board. 
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15345. The board shall act upon any groundwater management 
program or revision within one year after its submission to the board. 
15346. The board shall approve a groundwater management program 
or revision where it finds that the groundwater management objectives and 
implementation plans stated in the program are consistent with the 
policies and provisions of this division, and that the implementation plan 
will be adequate to achieve the groundwater management objectives stated 
in the program. 
CHAPTER 6. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 
15350. One year after the effective date of this division no 
land within any critical groundwater overdraft area shall be irrigated 
unless the land has been irrigated for at least one growing season in the 
immediately preceding three calendar years. 
15351. The restriction in Section 15350 shall remain in force in 
any critical groundwater overdraft area until the board has approved the 
program pursuant to Section 15346. Upon application, the board may grant 
individual exemptions to the requirements of Section 15350 where the board 
finds that the development would not result in the net increase of water 
use within the critical groundwater overdraft area and would otherwise be 
consistent with Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution. 
15352. The board shall not approve any application to 
appropriate water for an interbasin transfer to any critical groundwater 
overdraft basin until the board has approved the management and 
implementation programs for the area pursuant to the requirements and 
provisions of Section 15346. 
CHAPTER 7. EFFECT ON LOCAL ENTITIES 
15360. Nothing in this part shall be construed to preempt or 
otherwise interfere with any existing authority of local public entities 
to manage, regulate, or otherwise provide for groundwater or the 
extraction of groundwater in areas which are not designated as critical 
groundwater overdraft areas by Section 15320. 
CHAPTER 8. EXEMPTION FOR SMALL GROUNDWATER FACILITIES 
15370. Any well which produces less than 75 gallons of water per 
minute shall be exempt from any requirement imposed by this part or as a 
result of····the requirements of this··· part. 
PART 5. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
15400. Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, 
every affected public entity in California shall, to the fullest extent 
possible, implement the policies and the provisions of this division. 
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15401. The board· shall adopt regulations and take all 
appropriate actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to 
enforce the policies and provisions of this division. Any person may 
petition the board to enforce the provisions of this division, pursuant to 
procedures adopted by the board. 
15402. (a) Any person may, within 60 days after final action by 
the board, file a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court in 
and for the County of Sacramento regarding the validity of any 
administrative action of the board in carrying out the provisions and 
policies of the division. Failure to file the petition within 60 days 
shall preclude Pny person from challenging the board's action in any 
administrative or judicial proceeding. 
(b) Any person shall have standing to enforce the provisions of 
this division in a proceeding for declaratory or injunctive relief. 
Except as provided in subdivision (a), nothing in this section shall 
limit any other cause of action which may be available under other 
provisions of law. 
(c) The board may request the Attorney General to seek 
injunctive relief and other appropriate judicial remedies in the Superior 
Court in and for the County of Sacramento when necessary to enforce the 
provisions and the policies of this division. 
15403. This division may be 
procedures set forth in this section. 
is declared invalid, then subdivision 
amending or repealing this division. 
amended or repealed by the 
If any portion of subdivision (a) 
(b) shall be the exclusive means of 
(a) This division may be amended to further its purpose by 
statute, passed in each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, a 
majority of the membership concurring, and signed by the Governor, if at 
least 20 days prior to passage in each house the bill in its final form 
has been delivered to the board for distribution to the news media and to 
every person who has requested the board to send copies of those bills to 
him or her. 
(b) This division may be amended or repealed by a statute that 
becomes effective only when approved by the electors. 
15404. The people of the State of California find and declare 
that the policies and the provisions of this division are in furtherance 
of the policy of conservation and reasonable and beneficial use contained 
in Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution and, being 
necessary for the health, safety, and welfare of the state and its 
inhabitants, shall be liberally construed. 
15405. If any provision of this division or the application 
thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity 
shall not affect other provisions or applications of the division which 
can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to 
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1. SANTA CRUZ· PAJARO BASIN 
2. CUYAMA VALLEY BASIN 
3. VENTURA COUNTY BASIN 
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